Trade agreements are generally unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. We now deliver the story for the organization of our chapter. At the broadest level, trade agreements could be designed according to one of two standard economic traditions to address inefficiency (cf. Hoekman and Kostecki 1995, p. 59-60). A “top-down” approach would create a supranational authority that would define trade policy measures for each member country. A bottom-up approach would involve negotiations with the Coasean between governments, and an essential element to ensure effectiveness would be the existence of secure property rights on the objects that should be negotiated. In practice, international trade agreements are generally designed according to the second approach: each government has property rights over its own political instruments, but additional rules may be needed to guarantee property rights (for example. B for “market access”); Governments first negotiate (multilateral) rules; and they then negotiate effective policies in rules (bilateral, usually, but not always). The agreement must impose itself. All agreements concluded outside the WTO framework (which provide additional benefits beyond the WTO level, but which apply only between signatories and not other WTO members) are considered to be preferred by the WTO.
Under WTO rules, these agreements are subject to certain requirements, such as WTO notification and general reciprocity (preferences should apply equally to each signatory to the agreement), where unilateral preferences (some of the signatories enjoy preferential market access to the other signatories without reducing their tariffs) are allowed only in exceptional circumstances and as a temporary measure.  A trade agreement signed between more than two parties (usually neighbouring or in the same region) is considered multilateral. They face the main obstacles – to content negotiation and implementation. The more countries involved, the more difficult it is to achieve mutual satisfaction.